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Paul Staniland Is an assistant professor of polltlcal science at tho University of Chic.ago, where ho 
co-directs the Program on lntomatlonal Security Polley. His research Interests are In cfvil war. 
International -security, and ethnic polftlcs, prfmarlly In South Asia. His current book project and 
related articles examine organlzatlonal cohesion and fragmentation In Insurgent groups. Other wOf'k 
studies cfvil-mllltary relations. pro~statc paramlllt:arlsm In clv11 wars, Indian and Pakistani foreign and 
Internal security policy, and tho pol/tics of Insurgency and terrorism. 
Stanlland's work has been publlshed In Civil Wots, Comparative Politico/ Studies. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, fnternotlonol Security, Security Studies, and Washington Quarterly, among others. He 
teaches courses on clvll war and mllftary polhfcs , w ith a focus on the dcveloplng world. 
ABSTRACT 
Regimes deal with armed groups In remarkably diverse ways: In some contexts they wage total 
wars of annlh llatlon. In others they cut ltv~and•ICt•llve deals, and In yet others they closely ally with 
non•state actors. Varying topographies of armed order emerge and evolve across time and space. 
This project Introduces an ·armed polftlcs• framework that can Integrate the study o f state building, 
dvll war, and electoral vlofencc Into a unified analytical approach. 
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It conceptuallzcs and measures d ifferent armed orders - llmfted cooperadon, alliance, containment, and total war - and the 
pathways through which these orders end, In collapse or Incorporation. 
The project tl'lcn offers a new theory of how states evaluate armed groups, arguing that ldcologlcal perception and Instrumental 
Incentives combine to assign groups to six different polltlcal roles. These roles, ranging from mortal enemies to business partners 
to undesi rable, determine the strategics that governments pursue and the orders they seek to construct. Polltlcal Ideas about state 
and nation arc central to polltlcal conflict. Comparative evidence from South and Southeast Asia Illustrates how regime s perceive 
armed groups and the armed orders that emerge. 
